Untraceability of RFID protocols

Ton van Deursen; Sjouke Mauw; Saša Radomirović

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-79966-5_1

Untraceability of RFID protocols

Ton van Deursen^*, Sjouke Mauw, Saša Radomirović

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

53 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We give an intuitive formal definition of untraceability in the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model, inspired by existing definitions of anonymity. We show how to verify whether communication protocols satisfy the untraceability property and apply our methods to known RFID protocols. We show a previously unknown attack on a published RFID protocol and use our framework to prove that the protocol is not untraceable.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Information Security Theory and Practices. Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks
Subtitle of host publication	WISTP 2008
Publisher	Springer
Pages	1-15
Number of pages	15
ISBN (Electronic)	9783540799665
ISBN (Print)	9783540799658
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79966-5_1
Publication status	Published - 2008
Event	2nd IFIP WG 11.2 International Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices: Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks - Seville, Spain Duration: 13 May 2008 → 16 May 2008

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	5019
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	2nd IFIP WG 11.2 International Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices: Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks
Abbreviated title	WISTP 2008
Country/Territory	Spain
City	Seville
Period	13/05/08 → 16/05/08

Keywords

Formal verification
RFID protocols
Untraceability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-540-79966-5_1

Cite this

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title = "Untraceability of RFID protocols",

abstract = "We give an intuitive formal definition of untraceability in the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model, inspired by existing definitions of anonymity. We show how to verify whether communication protocols satisfy the untraceability property and apply our methods to known RFID protocols. We show a previously unknown attack on a published RFID protocol and use our framework to prove that the protocol is not untraceable.",

keywords = "Formal verification, RFID protocols, Untraceability",

author = "{van Deursen}, Ton and Sjouke Mauw and Sa{\v s}a Radomirovi{\'c}",

year = "2008",

doi = "10.1007/978-3-540-79966-5_1",

language = "English",

isbn = "9783540799658",

series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",

publisher = "Springer",

pages = "1--15",

booktitle = "Information Security Theory and Practices. Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks",

note = "2nd IFIP WG 11.2 International Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices: Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks, WISTP 2008 ; Conference date: 13-05-2008 Through 16-05-2008",

}

van Deursen, T, Mauw, S & Radomirović, S 2008, Untraceability of RFID protocols. in Information Security Theory and Practices. Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks: WISTP 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5019, Springer, pp. 1-15, 2nd IFIP WG 11.2 International Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices: Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks, Seville, Spain, 13/05/08. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79966-5_1

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AU - van Deursen, Ton

AU - Mauw, Sjouke

AU - Radomirović, Saša

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - We give an intuitive formal definition of untraceability in the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model, inspired by existing definitions of anonymity. We show how to verify whether communication protocols satisfy the untraceability property and apply our methods to known RFID protocols. We show a previously unknown attack on a published RFID protocol and use our framework to prove that the protocol is not untraceable.

AB - We give an intuitive formal definition of untraceability in the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model, inspired by existing definitions of anonymity. We show how to verify whether communication protocols satisfy the untraceability property and apply our methods to known RFID protocols. We show a previously unknown attack on a published RFID protocol and use our framework to prove that the protocol is not untraceable.

KW - Formal verification

KW - RFID protocols

KW - Untraceability

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=44649113207&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-540-79966-5_1

DO - 10.1007/978-3-540-79966-5_1

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:44649113207

SN - 9783540799658

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 1

EP - 15

BT - Information Security Theory and Practices. Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks

PB - Springer

T2 - 2nd IFIP WG 11.2 International Workshop on Information Security Theory and Practices: Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks

Y2 - 13 May 2008 through 16 May 2008

ER -

Untraceability of RFID protocols

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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