On a continuous mixed strategies model for Evolutionary game theory

Astridh Boccabella*, Roberto Natalini, Lorenzo Pareschi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary gametheory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies.Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we provesome analytical properties of the model and global estimates. The asymptoticbehavior and the stability of solutions in the case of two strategies is analyzedin details. Numerical schemes for two and three strategies which are able tocapture the correct equilibrium states are also proposed together with severalnumerical examples.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)187-213
Number of pages27
JournalKinetic and Related Models
Volume4
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2011

Keywords

  • Continuous mixed strategies
  • Evolutionary game theory
  • Kinetic equations
  • Numerical methods
  • Replicator dynamics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Numerical Analysis
  • Modelling and Simulation

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