Occupational risks, social insurance and investments in education

Dan Anderberg

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    A link between social insurance and education policy is explored. Due to moral hazard full insurance against disability is not feasible. When high- and low-risk individuals can be identified second-best social insurance system entails cross-subsidies from the low-risk group to the high-risk group. Implementation of this second-best insurance however distorts the human capital investment decisions when education qualifies for a low risk job. Therefore, the second-best social insurance together with an education subsidy is a welfare improving policy. An education policy also has the role of establishing dynamic consistency of the government's policy.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)425-441
    Number of pages17
    JournalJournal of Population Economics
    Volume13
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - 2000

    Fingerprint

    Education
    Social insurance
    Insurance
    Education policy
    Human capital investment
    Investment decision
    Welfare policy
    Cross-subsidies
    Dynamic consistency
    Moral hazard
    Government policy
    Individual risk
    Education subsidies

    Keywords

    • Disability pensions
    • Education policy
    • Time consistency

    Cite this

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    Occupational risks, social insurance and investments in education. / Anderberg, Dan.

    In: Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2000, p. 425-441.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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