Occupational risks, social insurance and investments in education

Dan Anderberg

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)


    A link between social insurance and education policy is explored. Due to moral hazard full insurance against disability is not feasible. When high- and low-risk individuals can be identified second-best social insurance system entails cross-subsidies from the low-risk group to the high-risk group. Implementation of this second-best insurance however distorts the human capital investment decisions when education qualifies for a low risk job. Therefore, the second-best social insurance together with an education subsidy is a welfare improving policy. An education policy also has the role of establishing dynamic consistency of the government's policy.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)425-441
    Number of pages17
    JournalJournal of Population Economics
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - 2000


    • Disability pensions
    • Education policy
    • Time consistency


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