Modeling human errors in security protocols

David Basin; Sasa Radomirovic; Lara Schmid

doi:10.1109/CSF.2016.30

Modeling human errors in security protocols

David Basin, Sasa Radomirovic, Lara Schmid

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

15 Citations (Scopus)

3 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Many security protocols involve humans, not machines, as endpoints. The differences are critical: humans are not only computationally weaker than machines, they are naive, careless, and gullible. In this paper, we provide a model for formalizing and reasoning about these inherent human limitations and their consequences. Specifically, we formalize models of fallible humans in security protocols as multiset rewrite theories. We show how the Tamarin tool can then be used to automatically analyze security protocols involving human errors. We provide case studies of authentication protocols that show how different protocol constructions and features differ in their effectiveness with respect to different kinds of fallible humans. This provides a starting point for a fine-grained classification of security protocols from a usable-security perspective.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2016 IEEE 29th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	325-340
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509026074
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CSF.2016.30
Publication status	Published - 11 Aug 2016
Event	29th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2016 - Lisbon, Portugal Duration: 27 Jun 2016 → 1 Jul 2016

Publication series

Name	IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
ISSN (Print)	1940-1434

Conference

Conference	29th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium 2016
Abbreviated title	CSF 2016
Country	Portugal
City	Lisbon
Period	27/06/16 → 1/07/16

Keywords

Formal Methods
Human Errors
Security Protocols
Usable Security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Engineering(all)

Access to Document

10.1109/CSF.2016.30

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Sasa Radomirovic
- Sasa.Radomirovic@hw.ac.uk
- School of Mathematical & Computer Sciences - Associate Professor
- School of Mathematical & Computer Sciences, Computer Science - Associate Professor
Person: Academic (Research & Teaching)

Cite this

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abstract = "Many security protocols involve humans, not machines, as endpoints. The differences are critical: humans are not only computationally weaker than machines, they are naive, careless, and gullible. In this paper, we provide a model for formalizing and reasoning about these inherent human limitations and their consequences. Specifically, we formalize models of fallible humans in security protocols as multiset rewrite theories. We show how the Tamarin tool can then be used to automatically analyze security protocols involving human errors. We provide case studies of authentication protocols that show how different protocol constructions and features differ in their effectiveness with respect to different kinds of fallible humans. This provides a starting point for a fine-grained classification of security protocols from a usable-security perspective.",

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AB - Many security protocols involve humans, not machines, as endpoints. The differences are critical: humans are not only computationally weaker than machines, they are naive, careless, and gullible. In this paper, we provide a model for formalizing and reasoning about these inherent human limitations and their consequences. Specifically, we formalize models of fallible humans in security protocols as multiset rewrite theories. We show how the Tamarin tool can then be used to automatically analyze security protocols involving human errors. We provide case studies of authentication protocols that show how different protocol constructions and features differ in their effectiveness with respect to different kinds of fallible humans. This provides a starting point for a fine-grained classification of security protocols from a usable-security perspective.

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