Investing in resources and dynamic bilateral contracting in an institutional context

Kate Hughes, Angelina Zubac

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Abstract

This paper further develops a theory of the firm that conceptualizes firms in resource-investment terms. Drawing on the human capital literature and property rights and agency theories, it devises an approach for examining how as a consequence of investing and working, including making resources available to firms, underpinned by combinations of explicit and implicit contractual agreements, capital-owners and resource-owners enable firms. The benefit of this approach is that scholars are given the means to understand how isomorphic explicit and implicit contracting forms able to facilitate firms’ various activities emerge over time. They are also given greater scope to better understand how firms contribute to economic growth and economic and social development as a result of engaging in resource-investment activities.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 2012
EventAcademy of Management Annual Conference 2012 - Boston, United States
Duration: 3 Aug 20127 Aug 2012

Conference

ConferenceAcademy of Management Annual Conference 2012
CountryUnited States
CityBoston
Period3/08/127/08/12

Keywords

  • Investing
  • resources
  • dynamic bilateral contracting

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    Hughes, K., & Zubac, A. (2012). Investing in resources and dynamic bilateral contracting in an institutional context. Paper presented at Academy of Management Annual Conference 2012, Boston, United States. http://proceedings.aom.org/