Abstract
This paper investigates equilibrium in an insurance market where risk classification is restricted. Insurance demand is characterised by an iso-elastic function with a single elasticity parameter. We characterise the equilibrium by three quantities: equilibrium premium; level of adverse selection (in the economist's sense); and `loss coverage', defined as the expected population losses compensated by insurance. We consider both equal elasticities for high and low risk-groups, and then different elasticities. In the equal elasticities case, adverse selection is always higher under pooling than under risk-differentiated premiums, while loss coverage first increases and then decreases with demand elasticity. We argue that loss coverage represents the efficacy of insurance for the whole population; and therefore that if demand elasticity is sufficiently low, adverse selection is not always a bad thing.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 265-291 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | ASTIN Bulletin: The Journal of the IAA |
Volume | 46 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 16 Feb 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - May 2016 |