Helping hand or grabbing hand? State bureaucracy and privatization effectiveness

J. David Brown, John S. Earle, Scott Gehlbach

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    58 Citations (Scopus)


    Why have economic reforms aimed at reducing the role of the state been successful in some cases but not others? Are reform failures the consequence of leviathan states that hinder private economic activity, or of weak states unable to implement policies effectively and provide a supportive institutional environment? We explore these questions in a study of privatization in postcommunist Russia. Taking advantage of large regional variation in the size of public administrations, and employing a multilevel research design that controls for preprivatization selection in the estimation of regional privatization effects, we examine the relationship between state bureaucracy and the impact of privatization on firm productivity. We find that privatization is more effective in regions with relatively large bureaucracies. Our analysis suggests that this effect is driven by the impact of bureaucracy on the postprivatization business environment, with better institutional support and less corruption when bureaucracies are large. © 2009 Copyright American Political Science Association.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)264-283
    Number of pages20
    JournalAmerican Political Science Review
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - May 2009


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