TY - GEN
T1 - From Bouncing Break-ins to Frictional Firewalls
T2 - Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2025 Workshops
AU - Arnaboldi, Luca
AU - Aspinall, David
AU - Kolb, Christina
AU - Radomirović, Saša
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2026.
PY - 2025/8/22
Y1 - 2025/8/22
N2 - We explore requirement interactions related to safety and security properties with an example based on automotive braking systems, to show ideas about co-engineering trustworthy systems. We start from risk assessments TARA (Threat and Risk Assessment, ISO 21434) and HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment, ISO 26262). These are often undertaken separately, resulting in requirements that may interact badly, for example, security features that compromise safety requirements, or sets of requirements that are impossible to satisfy together. Based on a minimal logical foundation for designing cyber-physical systems and considering requirement satisfaction across system changes, we classify several kinds of requirement interaction. These generalise the well-known case of (adverse) feature interactions; our suggestion is that understanding interactions can help during design or implementation revision cycles—even if requirements are considered without using formal methods.
AB - We explore requirement interactions related to safety and security properties with an example based on automotive braking systems, to show ideas about co-engineering trustworthy systems. We start from risk assessments TARA (Threat and Risk Assessment, ISO 21434) and HARA (Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment, ISO 26262). These are often undertaken separately, resulting in requirements that may interact badly, for example, security features that compromise safety requirements, or sets of requirements that are impossible to satisfy together. Based on a minimal logical foundation for designing cyber-physical systems and considering requirement satisfaction across system changes, we classify several kinds of requirement interaction. These generalise the well-known case of (adverse) feature interactions; our suggestion is that understanding interactions can help during design or implementation revision cycles—even if requirements are considered without using formal methods.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105014735692
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-032-02018-5_7
DO - 10.1007/978-3-032-02018-5_7
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:105014735692
SN - 978-3-032-02017-8
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
SP - 88
EP - 100
BT - Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security. SAFECOMP 2025 Workshops
A2 - Törngren, Martin
A2 - Gallina, Barbara
A2 - Schoitsch, Erwin
A2 - Troubitsyna, Elena
A2 - Bitsch, Friedemann
PB - Springer
Y2 - 9 September 2025 through 9 September 2025
ER -