Equilibrium design for concurrent games

Julian Gutierrez, Muhammad Najib, Giuseppe Perelli, Michael Wooldridge

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance, an equilibrium satisfying a given temporal logic property – a problem that we call equilibrium design. We base our study on a framework where system specifications are represented as temporal logic formulae, games as quantitative concurrent game structures, and players’ goals as mean-payoff objectives. In particular, we consider system specifications given by LTL and GR(1) formulae, and show that implementing a mechanism to ensure that a given temporal logic property is satisfied on some/every Nash equilibrium of the game, whenever such a mechanism exists, can be done in PSPACE for LTL properties and in NP/ΣP2 for GR(1) specifications. We also study the complexity of various related decision and optimisation problems, such as optimality and uniqueness of solutions, and show that the complexities of all such problems lie within the polynomial hierarchy. As an application, equilibrium design can be used as an alternative solution to the rational synthesis and verification problems for concurrent games with mean-payoff objectives whenever no solution exists, or as a technique to repair, whenever possible, concurrent games with undesirable rational outcomes (Nash equilibria) in an optimal way.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication30th International Conference on Concurrency Theory (CONCUR 2019)
EditorsWan Fokkink, Rob van Glabbeek
PublisherSchloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik
ISBN (Electronic)9783959771214
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019
Event30th International Conference on Concurrency Theory 2019 - Amsterdam, Netherlands
Duration: 27 Aug 201930 Aug 2019

Publication series

NameLeibniz International Proceedings in Informatics
Volume140
ISSN (Print)1868-8969

Conference

Conference30th International Conference on Concurrency Theory 2019
Abbreviated titleCONCUR 2019
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityAmsterdam
Period27/08/1930/08/19

Keywords

  • Games
  • Model checking
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Synthesis
  • Temporal logic

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software

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