Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders

Valentin Robu, Takayuki Ito, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes

Research output: Contribution to conferenceAbstract

Abstract

We study the design of efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values, that depend on signals of other bidders. In particular, we consider a contingent bid model in which bidders may explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. We derive constraints which allows the efficient second price, fixed point auction to be implemented in single-minded CAs, and present an alternative mechanism for cases in which the required single crossing condition fails.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2015
EventINFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015 - Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, United States
Duration: 1 Nov 20154 Nov 2015

Conference

ConferenceINFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015
CountryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia
Period1/11/154/11/15

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