Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders

Valentin Robu; Takayuki Ito; Nicholas R. Jennings; David C. Parkes

Abstract

We study the design of efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values, that depend on signals of other bidders. In particular, we consider a contingent bid model in which bidders may explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. We derive constraints which allows the efficient second price, fixed point auction to be implemented in single-minded CAs, and present an alternative mechanism for cases in which the required single crossing condition fails.

Original language	English
Publication status	Published - Nov 2015
Event	INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015 - Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, United States Duration: 1 Nov 2015 → 4 Nov 2015

Conference

Conference	INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015
Country/Territory	United States
City	Philadelphia
Period	1/11/15 → 4/11/15

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Robu, V., Ito, T., Jennings, N. R., & Parkes, D. C. (2015). Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. Abstract from INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015, Philadelphia, United States. https://informs.emeetingsonline.com/emeetings/formbuilder/clustersessiondtl.asp?csnno=23431&mmnno=272&ppnno=89872

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title = "Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders",

abstract = "We study the design of efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values, that depend on signals of other bidders. In particular, we consider a contingent bid model in which bidders may explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. We derive constraints which allows the efficient second price, fixed point auction to be implemented in single-minded CAs, and present an alternative mechanism for cases in which the required single crossing condition fails.",

author = "Valentin Robu and Takayuki Ito and Jennings, {Nicholas R.} and Parkes, {David C.}",

note = "(invited presentation, non-archival publication); INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015 ; Conference date: 01-11-2015 Through 04-11-2015",

year = "2015",

month = nov,

language = "English",

}

Robu, V, Ito, T, Jennings, NR & Parkes, DC 2015, 'Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders', INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015, Philadelphia, United States, 1/11/15 - 4/11/15. <https://informs.emeetingsonline.com/emeetings/formbuilder/clustersessiondtl.asp?csnno=23431&mmnno=272&ppnno=89872>

TY - CONF

T1 - Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders

AU - Robu, Valentin

AU - Ito, Takayuki

AU - Jennings, Nicholas R.

AU - Parkes, David C.

N1 - (invited presentation, non-archival publication)

PY - 2015/11

Y1 - 2015/11

N2 - We study the design of efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values, that depend on signals of other bidders. In particular, we consider a contingent bid model in which bidders may explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. We derive constraints which allows the efficient second price, fixed point auction to be implemented in single-minded CAs, and present an alternative mechanism for cases in which the required single crossing condition fails.

AB - We study the design of efficient auctions where bidders have interdependent values, that depend on signals of other bidders. In particular, we consider a contingent bid model in which bidders may explicitly condition the value of their bids on the bids submitted by others. We derive constraints which allows the efficient second price, fixed point auction to be implemented in single-minded CAs, and present an alternative mechanism for cases in which the required single crossing condition fails.

M3 - Abstract

T2 - INFORMS (Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences) Annual Meeting 2015

Y2 - 1 November 2015 through 4 November 2015

ER -

Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders

Abstract

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