Abstract
This study investigates the effects of board interlock on CEO compensation. We use an ordinary least square (OLS) for panel data approach and Social Network Analysis (SNA) procedures on a sample of 275 companies listed on the Brazilian stock exchange (B3), from 2011 to 2018, to evaluate the effects of board interlocks frameworks and some peculiarities of the Brazilian market on CEO compensation. Our empirical findings are twofold. First, our results indicate that the higher the board interlock level, the higher CEO compensation in the companies covered by our study. Second, the interlocks within business groups in the Brazilian market did not act as a moderator in the relationship between board interlock and CEO compensation, which indicates that the interlocks formed between companies listed on B3 are mostly between companies from different businesses groups. Overall, our study supports the perspectives of the agency and managerial power theories regarding the board of directors' role in setting the CEO compensation package and the issues that can influence this duty.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 444-465 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | International Journal of Disclosure and Governance |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 2 Oct 2022 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Dec 2022 |
Keywords
- Board interlock
- Board of directors
- Business groups
- CEO compensation
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management