Dispute Resolution in Voting

David Basin, Sasa Radomirovic, Lara Schmid

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Abstract

In voting, disputes arise when a voter claims that the voting authority is dishonest and did not correctly process his ballot while the authority claims to have followed the protocol. A dispute can be resolved if any third party can unambiguously determine who is right. We systematically characterize all relevant disputes for a generic, practically relevant, class of voting protocols. Based on our characterization, we propose a new definition of dispute resolution for voting that accounts for the possibility that both voters and the voting authority can make false claims and that voters may abstain from voting.A central aspect of our work is timeliness: a voter should possess the evidence required to resolve disputes no later than the election’s end. We characterize what assumptions are necessary and sufficient for timeliness in terms of a communication topology for our voting protocol class. We formalize the dispute resolution properties and communication topologies symbolically. This provides the basis for verification of dispute resolution for a broad class of protocols. To demonstrate the utility of our model, we analyze a mixnet-based voting protocol and prove that it satisfies dispute resolution as well as verifiability and receipt-freeness. To prove our claims, we combine machine-checked proofs with traditional pen-and-paper proofs.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2020 IEEE 33rd Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF)
PublisherIEEE
ISBN (Electronic)9781728165721
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Aug 2020

Publication series

NameIEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
ISSN (Electronic)2374-8303

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

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