Chosen-name Attacks: An Overlooked Class of Type-flaw Attacks

Pieter Ceelen*, Sjouke Mauw, Saša Radomirović

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)
31 Downloads (Pure)


In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has been overlooked in all significant protocol verification frameworks based on formal methods. We identify and classify new type-flaw attacks arising from this capability. Several examples of protocols that are vulnerable to this type of attack are given, including Lowe's modification of KSL. The consequences for automatic verification tools are discussed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)31-43
Number of pages13
JournalElectronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 22 Feb 2008


  • automatic verification
  • security protocols
  • semantics
  • type-flaw attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)


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