Cartels and asymmetric cost pass-through: evidence from Brazilian gas stations

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Abstract

I analyse if collusive agreements are responsible for asymmetric cost pass-through in the Brazilian retail gasoline market. I find that, overall, Brazilian stations do not present asymmetric cost pass-through. However, this phenomenon is observed in stations that belong to a cartel. This different behavior is due to cartelised stations increasing their price more than non-cartelised ones when faced by increases in costs.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2034-2042
Number of pages9
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume42
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 30 Dec 2022

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