Bidding for research initiatives: A reprise

Geoffrey J. Wyatt

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    The implications of competitive bidding between universities and other institutes for research funding are examined. The process of competitive rent seeking can absorb research resources of similar magnitude to the research funds available. A basic model involving two similar 'universities' is set out initially. It is then shown how the non-cooperative equilibrium implies that the overall cost of the research bidding process increases with (i) an increase in the number of bidders, (ii) an increase in the care with which research proposals are scrutinised, and (iii) a decline in the dispersion of costs of proposal generation.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)313-314
    Number of pages2
    JournalKyklos
    Volume52
    Issue number3
    Publication statusPublished - 1999

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