This paper develops a model for bank lending in economies in transition. Many loans in the banks portfolio are non-performing as former state-owned companies are still to be restructured and therefore at least in the short-run short of cash-flow to service their loans. The bank now faces the following dilemma: should it terminate the loan irrespective of the future profitability thereby pushing the company into bankruptcy or should it extend its credit facilities thereby risking throwing good money after bad? This paper will argue that the bank should support a firm willing to undergo sufficient restructuring by extending existing credit facilities. On the other hand, the bank should initiate bankruptcy procedures against firms unwilling to undergo restructuring. The analysis is confined to small and medium-sized enterprises as large firms frequently get implicit or explicit government support. © 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
|Number of pages||8|
|Journal||Small Business Economics|
|Publication status||Published - 1996|