Abstract
The UK Government has been able to learn lessons from previous emergency responses, including the H1N1 (2009) influenza pandemic and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (2011). However, the Science and Technology Committee’s report on the Ebola epidemic demonstrates that preparation for an infectious disease emergency is less robust than it ought to be. The report highlighted that: it is unclear how information is escalated across Government; there is no overarching strategy for dealing with emerging infectious diseases; there was systemic delay in both the UK Government and international responses; and neither the UK nor the international community was ‘research ready’ when the outbreak occurred.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Publisher | Royal Society of Edinburgh |
| Commissioning body | House of Commons Science and Technology Committee |
| Number of pages | 11 |
| Publication status | Published - May 2016 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 3 Good Health and Well-being
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