A framework for fraud discovery via illicit agreements in energy markets

Fundamental changes in the electrical energy sector are drawing on serious implications leading to high heterogeneity in both supply and demand. One focal point in transitioning to the smart grid vision is the liberalization and deregulation of electricity markets, which are undergoing a transformation towards accommodating a more decentralized and sustainable provision of energy. As the number of traders in the market is increasing steadily and the trading activities are becoming more complex, the energy markets are becoming more exposed to potential fraud. In this paper we address the problem of detecting collusive behavior, where a group of individual traders act together, inconsistently with the competitive model, to artificially manipulate the market and elicit illegal profits. We investigate collusion attacks in the energy market and propose a novel mechanism, showing the effectiveness and practical applicability of our method to real scenarios. Thus, while economic analysis does not imply proving guilt, it can be instrumental in making decisions about identifying market participants worthy of closer inspection from appointed antitrust authorities.